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COLUMN: A Turkey Without Terrorism: Both Near and Far

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By Güldem Atabay

Turkey’s political agenda is currently dominated by the government’s intensifying battle with the main opposition CHP, and the increasingly entangled progress of the so-called “Terror-Free Turkey” initiative.

Targeting the Istanbul Municipality and the Opposition

In President Erdoğan’s confrontation with Ekrem İmamoğlu and the CHP, the latest wave of operations appears aimed at paralyzing the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB). While pro-government media claim the fourth wave of interventions will be the last, few believe this cycle is truly over. Meanwhile, in financial markets, recent interest rate hikes have revived carry trade dynamics. However, deteriorating expectations and a deepening trust deficit are weighing heavily on the real economy.

In this volatile context, as Murat Yetkin has outlined, the Terror-Free Turkey project appears to be deadlocked over who should take the first step—a stalemate that casts a shadow over Erdoğan’s potential re-election strategy.

COMMENTARY: Why Public Opinion Polls in Turkey Matter Beyond Election Seasons

Erdoğan’s Inner Circle Draws Fire

One of Erdoğan’s top advisors, Mehmet Uçum, continues to stir controversy by issuing politically charged statements on X (formerly Twitter) despite holding no elected office. Last week, Uçum dismissed the use of the term “political prisoners” in reference to jailed members of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party. His tone drew an unusually sharp rebuke from party co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan, signaling escalating tensions.

Multiple Bottlenecks in the Peace Process

The Terror-Free Turkey initiative is facing obstacles on several fronts:

  1. MHP’s Pressure on AKP: Erdoğan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli, has proposed a 100-member parliamentary commission. The AKP appears uncomfortable with this, discussing the formation of an alternative, independent committee to handle the Kurdish peace process. Reports suggest increasing frustration within the AKP ranks over Bahçeli’s public interventions, which are seen as coercive and obstructive.

  2. PKK’s Reluctance: The PKK has not shown willingness to disarm. Recent statements from senior figure Murat Karayılan and leaked footage indicate a hardened stance.

  3. No Disarmament, No Commission: Without a formal PKK disarmament declaration, forming a parliamentary commission is politically untenable. Additionally, the demand to lift Abdullah Öcalan’s isolation—which would pave the way for his return to active politics—remains unresolved.

This leaves only one feasible path: reforming the penal execution law.

Focus Shifting to Penal Code Revisions

According to recent reports, a revised execution law may be passed before the Eid holiday, with broader provisions than initially expected.

For DEM Party figures like Tülay Hatimoğulları, constitutional reform is not the immediate priority. Instead, they emphasize the need for a political “clean slate” beforehand:

  1. Öcalan’s Isolation: Conditions must change to reopen dialogue channels.

  2. Political and Sick Prisoners: A new penal law is urgent, especially since COVID-era legislation excluded political inmates.

  3. Court Rulings: European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Constitutional Court decisions on figures like Selahattin Demirtaş, Figen Yüksekdağ, Osman Kavala, and Can Atalay must be implemented.

  4. Anti-Terror Law Reform: Major revisions are needed to the current framework.

  5. Equal Citizenship: Ensuring equal rights for all citizens before any new constitutional drafting.

  6. Trust in Democracy: The controversial “trustee” (kayyım) policy must end, with elected officials reinstated.

In essence, while DEM supports the PKK transitioning into politics and Öcalan’s potential release, it also insists that at least some democratic demands be met along the way.

Murat Yetkin: Disarming the PKK Will Be Far From Easy

Erdoğan’s New Strategy: Pressuring CHP Through Dual Messaging

Meanwhile, polls consistently show CHP maintaining its lead over the ruling AKP. Although the gap widened after the March 19 events, it now appears stable.

Erdoğan’s harsh rhetoric is clearly aimed not only at İmamoğlu but also at CHP leader Özgür Özel. The message is thinly veiled: if Özel distances himself from İmamoğlu and emulates the more passive approach of former leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, his political survival will be guaranteed.

Erdoğan seems to offer Özel peace and political comfort in exchange for a return to the CHP’s pre-2023 posture—potentially opening the door to a joint constitutional reform effort that would secure Erdoğan’s path to another presidential term.

Additionally, Erdoğan is leveraging the lawsuit to cancel CHP’s June 30 convention as a form of political blackmail. The underlying message to Özel is clear: cooperate with me, and you can stay in power.

So far, Özel has resisted this bait. As long as polling continues to show upward momentum, he appears committed to his current political course.

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURE: PA Turkey intends to inform Turkey watchers with diverse views and opinions. Articles in our website may not necessarily represent the view of our editorial board or count as endorsement.


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