In a remarkable turn of events on May 28, the presidential elections in Türkiye ignited a profound transformation in the intricate relationship between politics and voters, reshaping the very essence of leadership and its accomplishments. Some Western and Arab media outlets, along with their pundits, had placed their bets on President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s defeat, a figure who has held the reins of power for the past two decades.
Before the elections, criticism of the opposition had mounted against Erdoğan’s administration’s unpopular economic policies and allegedly slow response to the Feb. 6 tremors that ravaged southeastern Türkiye and northwestern Syria, resulting in a tragic loss of over 50,000 lives.
The electoral campaign unfolded with gripping intensity, resembling a captivating Hitchcockian narrative, transforming the Turkish elections into an outstanding work of nonfiction and political intrigue, captivating audiences worldwide.
A new paradigm was being set for the MENA region with the realization that shattered the illusion of invincibility held by authoritarian leaders in Arab nations. The realization took hold that change could indeed emerge from within the system itself. Consequently, countries with a political culture rooted in the concept of a modern nation-state – such as Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Syria and post-independence Iraq – became ensnared in a dilemma, torn between the competing ideologies of secularism and traditional local conservatism.
Disconnection in discourse
The disconnect in political discourse and projects is a major issue in Arab countries. The divide between the elite and the masses, as well as between radical secularists and traditionalists, has left these states perplexed. In contrast, Türkiye demonstrates positive secularism, political maturity and a strong commitment to democracy, as shown by events like the failed coup attempt by the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) on July 15, 2016, and the recent parliamentary and presidential election in 2023. This raises the question of why peaceful political transitions succeed in Türkiye but fail in Arab countries.
Tunisia provides an example, with the constitutional coup in 2021 leaving the country at a crossroads. The choices are either following the path of Türkiye, where millions turned a failed coup into a victory for the people and democracy or surrendering. Unfortunately, recent developments in Tunisia suggest the latter outcome is more likely.
Similarities can be observed between Türkiye’s politics and those of Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Iraq under the ousted leader Saddam Hussein’s regime. Tunisia, while somewhat different because of its political-cultural exceptionalism, shares some parallels with Türkiye, particularly in terms of its strong secularism values among the elite.
Another country in the region where the military institution wields significant influence in domestic politics is Algeria. Like in Türkiye’s past, the Algerian military, along with radical secularists, employed fear tactics in January 1992. These tactics mirror those previously used in Türkiye in 1997, Algeria in 1992, and to a lesser extent, in Tunisia today.
In 2020, President Erdoğan presented a political model that attracted the attention of legalist religionists in Arab countries. This paradigm became relevant in the Türkiye-Tunisia relations after the Jasmine Revolution and the rise of Tunisia’s a-Nahdha party. A comparative analysis could draw parallels between the thoughts of the American founding fathers and the French Revolution.
Understanding the relationship between Türkiye and Tunisia, as well as other semi-secular Arab countries in the post-modern era, requires acknowledging two important aspects.
Firstly, both Tunisia and Türkiye have a strong foundation of secular values. Tunisia’s former President Lahbib Bourguiba, often referred to as the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Arabia, played a significant role in establishing this secular backbone. Secondly, both societies maintain deep traditionalist roots. In Tunisia, legalist religionists have gained political influence and are no longer solely reliant on public opinion polls to legitimize their power. Similarly, in Türkiye, there is a nuanced approach to combining “Islamism” ideology with traditionalism, nationalism, and pragmatic “neo-Islamism.”
Despite the 75 years of the French protectorate in Tunisia, the memory of the 300-year Ottoman presence has not been erased. President Bourguiba, despite his strong commitment to Tunisian sovereignty, openly admired the modernization efforts of Atatürk. This sentiment is also present among the elite in Algeria and Egypt, despite political rivalries during Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt and the rule of Mohammed Ali Pasha. Westernization was embraced by the Egyptian political and financial elite, as was the case in Türkiye after the Sevres and Lausanne treaties.
In recent times, Türkiye views Tunisia as a gateway to Africa, along with Libya and Algeria. President Erdoğan’s surprise visit to Tunisia in December 2019, where he engaged in discussions with his Tunisian counterpart, Kais Saied, preceded his anti-Haftar offensive in Libya. Additionally, Erdoğan visited Algeria in February 2020 following the election of President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in December 2019.
Paranoia in Arab nations
It is difficult to clearly see this relationship of fascination-rejection between the Turkish administration and pro-France and some Nasserist Arab elite in Arab countries. On the political level, Erdoğan’s attempts at interference are as much a source of discomfort as the religionists’ servility toward him, notes a left-wing observer. However, on a more grassroots level, the Arab population is attracted to the “sublime gate” and Erdoğan as a leader because they feel like “orphans” at home, and the Turkish president is “the voice of the voiceless” in the region.
There is an openly expressed anti-Türkiye sentiment among some secular parties and elites in Arab countries, driven by fears of a rising “Neo-Ottomanism” narrative in the region. This sentiment is shared in Algeria and Tunisia, particularly among those who value pro-French cultural influences, and it has caused unease regarding the Ankara-Algiers rapprochement in 2020.
If Arab political elites, media and decision-makers can overcome their intellectual paranoia and gain a better understanding of Erdoğan’s true political beliefs and background, they would realize that his project is not solely religious or Islamic as portrayed by the so-called Arab liberal elite and nationalist media and politicians. President Erdoğan’s political project primarily represents a Turkish nationalist and traditional-conservative trend, which Arab youth admire and wish to see in their own countries.
It is hoped that the animosity between Arab pro-French values and Nasserist-nationalist leaders and elites does not devolve into a simple ideological clash between religionists and secularists. Rather, it could signal a shift toward real representation by people’s representatives and the dismantling of archaic, oligarchic systems and state-controlled societal policing.
This would confirm the need for elections to be accompanied by the application of the rule of law, as desired by the Arab population.
Arabs are grappling with the challenge of nurturing democracy amid the relentless efforts of extremist forces spanning from the left to the right fringes. The question arises: How can democracy thrive in the face of such threats to peaceful transitions of power?
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