FA/Henri Barkey: Erdoğan’s Final Act? Mounting Opposition and Missteps Signal the End of an Era

Crackdown Backfires as Imamoglu Arrest Ignites Massive Protests

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, once hailed as a transformative leader, now appears to be fighting for his political survival. His March 2025 decision to arrest Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, widely seen as a rising opposition star and potential presidential contender, has sparked a nationwide backlash. The highly publicized raid on İmamoğlu’s home—carried out by 200 police officers—and subsequent indictment on flimsy charges of terrorism and corruption triggered the largest wave of anti-government protests in more than a decade.

İmamoğlu’s arrest didn’t create the crisis—it crystallized a broader erosion of Erdoğan’s popularity. A Pew Research survey earlier this year showed that 55% of Turks view Erdoğan unfavorably, while his Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered significant losses in the 2024 local elections. The public unrest that followed İmamoğlu’s detention—ranging from mass demonstrations to boycotts of pro-government businesses—signals a shift in Turkey’s political landscape. Protesters have grown more organized and defiant, with millions taking to the streets across dozens of provinces.

Eroding Control and Growing Opposition

Erdoğan’s repressive measures—targeting İmamoğlu’s allies, business contacts, and even family members—now seem more desperate than strategic. The opposition, long fragmented and reactive, is suddenly unified under dynamic new leadership. İmamoğlu’s popularity continues to grow even behind bars, with comparisons being drawn to other jailed reformers like Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim.

Crucially, Erdoğan’s latest attempt to sideline İmamoğlu comes at a time when his own political options are narrowing. Constitutionally limited to two presidential terms, Erdoğan’s mandate expires in 2028. But his declining support makes a constitutional amendment or early election increasingly unlikely. If elections were held today, polling suggests he would lose.

A Pattern of Repression

İmamoğlu is not the first prominent rival Erdoğan has imprisoned. Kurdish opposition leader Selahattin Demirtaş has been jailed since 2016 on charges widely viewed as politically motivated. Erdoğan has used crises—such as the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 failed military coup—to justify crackdowns, consolidate power, and dismantle institutional checks and balances. The 2017 constitutional referendum further centralized authority in the presidency, virtually eliminating parliamentary oversight.

This authoritarian shift has had deep consequences: elected Kurdish mayors have been routinely removed, courts have been undermined, and dissent criminalized. From 2014 to 2020, over 160,000 Turks were investigated for “insulting the president.” Erdoğan’s power increasingly depends on fear, repression, and legal manipulation.

Economic Fallout and Elite Friction

Imamoğlu’s arrest has also shaken investor confidence. Already fragile, the Turkish economy reeled as the lira plunged and $46 billion in central bank reserves were spent to stabilize the currency. Markets are rattled by the government’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies, which contradict its promises of reform and economic stabilization. Erdoğan’s seizure of assets from alleged political enemies further undermines trust in the rule of law.

Even elite institutions are pushing back. Leaders of the powerful Turkish Industry and Business Association criticized the pre-conviction confiscation of property—only to face criminal investigations themselves. The signal was clear: no dissent is tolerated, even from within Erdoğan’s traditional support base.

A Threat He Can’t Silence

İmamoğlu is different from Erdoğan’s past challengers. As Istanbul’s mayor, he built a reputation for efficient, inclusive governance and a personable leadership style that stands in sharp contrast to Erdoğan’s increasingly aloof, authoritarian demeanor. His 2019 victory in Istanbul—despite Erdoğan’s attempts to annul the election—marked a turning point in Turkish politics.

In 2022, İmamoğlu was convicted for allegedly insulting election officials and banned from politics. Yet every effort to marginalize him has backfired. Just days before his March 2025 arrest, Istanbul University annulled İmamoğlu’s decades-old college degree, likely to disqualify him from running for president. Four days later, his party held a symbolic primary—with 15 million citizens casting ballots in support of their jailed candidate.

İmamoğlu has become the undisputed leader of Turkey’s democratic opposition. From prison, he continues to communicate with the public, galvanizing support and undermining the image of Erdoğan as an invincible strongman.

A Shifting Political Landscape

In a further blow to Erdoğan’s dominance, a potential Kurdish peace process has reemerged. In late 2024, Erdoğan’s ultranationalist coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli, initiated dialogue with Kurdish representatives and the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. By May 2025, the PKK formally renounced its armed struggle and disbanded. Although Erdoğan allowed the dialogue to unfold, he expressed little enthusiasm and kept his messaging focused on national security.

For Kurdish leaders, democratization—not just peace—is now the primary goal. But this poses a dilemma for Erdoğan: real reforms would mean dismantling the very authoritarian apparatus he has spent years building. If he thwarts the peace initiative, he risks alienating Bahçeli and fracturing his parliamentary coalition.

The Trump Factor and Dwindling Foreign Support

One of Erdoğan’s few international reprieves is U.S. President Donald Trump’s support. Unlike his predecessor Joe Biden, who kept Erdoğan at arm’s length, Trump has warmly embraced him. Washington has remained silent on İmamoğlu’s arrest. But this cozy relationship comes at a cost: Erdoğan can no longer scapegoat the United States as a hostile force, a tactic he’s long used to rally domestic support.

No Way Out?

To stay in power, Erdoğan would need either a constitutional amendment or early elections—both of which seem increasingly unlikely given his unpopularity and declining parliamentary support. Polls by KONDA show that 67% of Turks now believe Erdoğan’s re-election would be “bad” for the country, and over 60% reject the charges against İmamoğlu.

Erdoğan remains defiant, using his control over the judiciary, police, and media to suppress dissent. But Turkey’s political ground is shifting. The public has grown weary. The opposition is energized and unified. And Erdoğan, once a master tactician, appears trapped by his own overreach.

Legacy at Stake

Erdoğan still has a choice: he could engineer a dignified exit and help oversee a peaceful transition. But if he continues on his current path—escalating repression, undermining democratic norms, and fueling unrest—his final years in power may be remembered not for stability or strength, but for autocracy and decline.

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