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Economic Stagnation Reshapes Voter Behavior in Turkey’s Provinces

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Turkey’s regional economies are no longer just shaping livelihoods—they are increasingly influencing ballot boxes. A new study by Yağmur Uzunırmak from the Social Studies Institute (Toplum Çalışmaları Enstitüsü) reveals a strong and systematic link between long-term economic stagnation and changing voter preferences across Turkish provinces. By applying the European concept of the “regional development trap” to Turkey, Uzunırmak demonstrates how persistent economic slowdown is translating into measurable political shifts.

What Is a Regional Development Trap?

Rather than defining underdevelopment through a single year or a single indicator, Uzunırmak frames the development trap as a long-term, multi-dimensional process of economic stagnation. Her approach focuses not only on income levels but on whether regions are able to sustain economic momentum over time.

As Uzunırmak explains:

“Economic dynamism may weaken without yet showing permanent stagnation, but regions where some indicators deteriorate are categorized as ‘high risk.’ Regions that show simultaneous and repeated underperformance across multiple indicators are considered to be ‘in the development trap.’”

This definition moves beyond snapshot economics and instead captures structural and persistent weaknesses—an approach increasingly favored in international regional development research.

Measuring Economic Performance Across Provinces

Using data spanning 2010 to 2024, the study evaluates provincial economic performance through three core indicators:
GDP per capita, labor force participation rate, and worker productivity. Each province is assessed in three comparative dimensions: its own historical performance, its NUTS2 regional average, and the national average of Turkey.

Uzunırmak notes:

“GDP per capita was obtained directly from province-level data published by TURKSTAT. Labor force participation was calculated by combining TURKSTAT’s population data for individuals aged 15 and over with SGK data on insured workers.”

This layered comparison makes it possible to determine not only whether a province is slowing down, but whether it is falling behind relative to both its past and its peers.

Adana as a Case Study in Declining Momentum

To illustrate the method, Uzunırmak closely examines Adana, comparing its performance across the 2010–2014 and 2014–2018 periods. The analysis evaluates whether Adana’s economic momentum weakened not just internally, but also compared to regional and national trends.

As she puts it:

“The question is whether Adana’s economic momentum in the second period weakened not only compared to its own past, but also relative to its region and the national average.”

This approach highlights how relative decline—rather than absolute poverty—can be a critical driver of political dissatisfaction.

Provinces Most Affected by the Development Trap

The study also calculates how many years each province spent in the development trap during 2019–2022. Afyonkarahisar, Isparta, and Burdur emerged as the most affected, spending three out of four years classified within the trap. In contrast, major metropolitan provinces such as İzmir and Ankara did not enter the category at all during this period.

These distinctions become especially significant when economic data is paired with electoral outcomes.

Economic Stagnation and Shifting Votes

By matching the number of years provinces spent in the development trap with vote share changes between 2018 and 2023, Uzunırmak uncovers a striking pattern. In provinces that never fell into the development trap, the AK Party experienced an average vote loss of 4.75 percentage points. However, in provinces trapped for three years, that loss more than doubled to 10.15 points.

The CHP, meanwhile, followed the opposite trajectory. Its vote share increased by an average of 2.26 points in provinces unaffected by the trap, but climbed to 4.53 points in provinces where economic stagnation persisted for three years.

Summarizing the findings, Uzunırmak states:

“These findings indicate that in provinces where economic tightness becomes persistent, voter preferences change in a stronger and more systematic way.”

Beyond Economics: Class Structure and Social Change

Uzunırmak emphasizes that the implications go beyond economics alone. Since the 1960s, rapid rural-to-urban migration has reshaped Turkey’s human capital and class structure, creating political behavior patterns that differ from those observed in Western countries. While data limitations require analysis at the provincial level, the findings still reveal deep connections between economic structure and political dynamics.

As she notes:

“This relationship points to consequences not only in terms of economic performance, but also in terms of class transformation, social stratification, and the political dynamics of the economy.”

Why the Development Trap Matters for Turkey’s Politics

The study ultimately positions the development trap as a crucial lens for understanding political change in Turkey. Persistent economic stagnation does not merely suppress growth—it alters expectations, reshapes social identities, and pushes voters toward new political choices. For analysts, policymakers, and political observers alike, Uzunırmak’s work underscores the importance of regional economic vitality as a foundation of democratic stability.

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