Russia Risks Losing Iran After Syria, Analyst Warns

Summary:
Moscow’s cautious optimism in the early days of the Israel-Iran war is giving way to deeper strategic concerns. As the war threatens to reshape the regional balance, veteran journalist and Russia expert Hakan Aksay argues that Russia’s fading diplomatic leverage and overextension in Ukraine could cost it not just Syria—but Iran too.
When Israel launched its first major strikes against Iran, the initial mood in Moscow was surprisingly calm—some even described it as “cautiously optimistic.” Russian policymakers saw potential advantages: global attention shifting away from Ukraine, a possible weakening of U.S. defense focus in Europe, and higher oil prices bolstering Russian revenues.
But that optimism is beginning to fade.
According to journalist and Russia expert Hakan Aksay, Moscow’s early hopes hinged on the idea that the Israel-Iran conflict might relieve some pressure on the Russian military in Ukraine. A redirection of U.S. missile defense systems to the Middle East, for example, was already being interpreted as a strategic reprieve for Russian forces. Additionally, the possibility of surging oil prices—still moderate as of now—promised economic benefits for an energy-dependent Kremlin.
At the diplomatic level, Russia also attempted to leverage its unique position: maintaining close ties with both Iran and Israel. Putin’s longstanding rapport with Netanyahu was seen as a potential asset in any future mediation effort. Moscow offered to act as a broker almost immediately, calling for restraint and dialogue.
However, when President Vladimir Putin raised the issue in a recent phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump, the American leader responded bluntly: “End the Ukraine war first,” he reportedly told Putin, rejecting Russia’s role as mediator.
Iran Tensions Expose Fragile Alliances
Russia’s relationship with Iran has been complex. Despite signing a 47-article Strategic Partnership Agreement in January 2025, Aksay points out that the pact—unlike Russia’s defense pacts with countries like North Korea—does not bind either side to military support.
Moscow’s refusal to supply Iran with Su-35 fighter jets or S-400 air defense systems underscores the distance between the two supposed allies. Putin even stated publicly on June 18 that “Iran has not requested military assistance—and they showed little interest when we previously offered our systems.”
The gap between rhetoric and reality may widen if the war escalates. Should the Iranian regime fall or undergo transformation, Russia’s influence in the region would be further eroded.
From Astana to Abandonment?
Aksay compares the fragility of Russia-Iran ties to Moscow’s lost position in Syria. The Astana Process (2016–2024) once aligned Russia, Iran, and Turkey in managing the Syrian civil war. But after Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December, Russia was left trying to merely maintain its bases, while Iran lost all ground. Turkey, by contrast, gained influence—and according to Putin himself, Israel was the true geopolitical winner.
Now, some voices within Russia—including ultra-nationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin—warn that failure to support Tehran might embolden the West to target Moscow next. But the Kremlin has so far resisted pressure to intervene directly.
Instead, China appears to be emerging as Iran’s more reliable partner. Beijing’s reported military aid to Tehran and its deep energy ties—China sources 8% of its oil from Iran—signal a realignment in the region. Western intelligence and Israeli officials are said to be more concerned about Chinese involvement than Russian.
Meanwhile, Russia’s ties with Israel remain complicated. Although the Netanyahu-Putin friendship has cooled, Israel’s reported supply of Patriot missile systems to Ukraine has irritated Moscow. Nonetheless, the Kremlin is careful not to burn bridges—not with Israel, nor with the U.S. or Gulf countries. Russia is still home to over a million former Soviet Jews, many of whom reside in Israel—a demographic factor that continues to weigh on Moscow’s foreign policy.
Putin Prioritizes Ukraine—at a Cost
For Putin, the Ukraine war remains the overriding priority. Aksay suggests the Kremlin is willing to remain passive on Iran—even at the cost of strategic losses—in order to focus on securing a favorable outcome in Ukraine. But that bet may come at a steep price.
“If Russia loses Iran after already losing Syria,” Aksay warns, “its regional influence will suffer a major blow.”
About the Author:
Hakan Aksay is one of Turkey’s leading experts on Russia and post-Soviet states. A former member of the Turkish Communist Party, he studied journalism at Leningrad State University during the Brezhnev-Gorbachev era and later worked as a journalist in East Germany. He spent two decades in Moscow reporting for various Turkish media outlets and launched multiple Turkish-Russian cultural and academic initiatives, including the June 3rd Nazım Hikmet Memorials. Aksay returned to Turkey in 2009 and has since worked with T24, Gazete Duvar, Tele1, and Artı TV. He holds Russia’s Pushkin Medal and is the author of four books in Turkish and Russian.