Carnegie International: Why the EU Needs Turkey to Stabilize the South Caucasus

As tensions in the South Caucasus remain unresolved, the European Union is looking to renew its strategic engagement in the region. Under the leadership of EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, Brussels is reassessing its approach to ensure the region stays within Europe’s sphere of influence—particularly amid waning U.S. interest and increasing geopolitical complexity.

A Fragmented EU Approach So Far

Until now, the EU’s involvement in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia has largely been piecemeal. While Brussels has developed bilateral ties across trade, energy, and governance, it lacks a unified regional strategy.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 briefly energized the EU’s role, not only to counter Moscow’s regional influence but also to encourage local actors to take responsibility for regional stability. Yet this momentum has slowed. With Washington stepping back and the binary logic of “Russia versus the West” no longer dominant, the EU is now being forced to reconfigure its posture.

Turkey’s Rising Strategic Value

In this new environment, Turkey’s importance is hard to ignore. As a vital transit corridor for Caspian energy and a bridge linking the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Europe, Ankara plays a pivotal role in the region’s connectivity.

Turkey is also becoming more central to European security conversations—whether through its NATO role, its involvement in Black Sea security, or its diplomatic weight in the Ukraine and Syria crises. While EU-Turkey ties remain fraught, there is growing recognition in Brussels that cooperation with Ankara is essential for success in the South Caucasus.

Turkey’s historic influence in the region—once viewed with suspicion in Europe—is now seen as an asset. Policymakers in both capitals increasingly acknowledge the need for pragmatic alignment.

Cyprus and Misconceptions Still Linger

Yet obstacles remain. One major stumbling block is Cyprus. The decades-long dispute continues to seep into unrelated policy areas, including the South Caucasus, threatening to derail progress. Brussels will need to compartmentalize this issue to maintain focus on shared strategic goals.

Another challenge lies in how European officials view Turkey’s role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. While some expect Ankara to pressure Baku into compromise, others see Azerbaijan as the dominant party. Both perspectives simplify what is in fact a complex strategic alliance.

Turkey’s reluctance to push Baku should not be mistaken for passivity or self-interest. Instead, Ankara is treading carefully to avoid straining relations with a close regional partner. Meanwhile, its behind-the-scenes diplomacy—encouraging Yerevan’s constructive participation and urging restraint in Baku—has gone largely unnoticed in public EU discourse.

Armenia’s Strategic Shift

Yerevan is undergoing its own transformation. The potential normalization of ties with Ankara is increasingly framed not only as historical reconciliation, but as a path to deeper engagement with the EU and a reduction of dependency on Russia.

However, some EU capitals—especially Paris—remain influenced by domestic political dynamics, including Armenian diaspora lobbying that often takes a harder line on Turkey than Armenia’s own government. France’s strained ties with both Ankara and Baku complicate the EU’s ability to act cohesively in the region.

Transportation and Connectivity Are Key

One of the most tangible areas for EU-Turkey cooperation lies in reopening transit routes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. These transportation links—halted since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war—are essential not just for Baku-Yerevan normalization, but also for Ankara’s outreach to Armenia.

Russia has sought a role in overseeing these discussions, but there is room for the EU to step in. Brussels could facilitate a separate transportation agreement supported by financial and technical assistance. Turkey’s participation would help ease Baku’s longstanding skepticism toward third-party involvement.

This area also ties into the Middle Corridor initiative—a strategic trade route connecting Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Turkey. For both the EU and Turkey, the corridor offers a critical alternative to Russian-controlled infrastructure, especially after the war in Ukraine disrupted traditional routes.

A Common Regional Agenda

Beyond bilateral issues, Brussels and Ankara share a broader interest in promoting stability and integration across the South Caucasus. Confidence-building measures and regional dialogue could be co-sponsored, leveraging Turkey’s convening power and the EU’s institutional and financial strength.

Such collaboration may also offer Brussels a way to re-engage with Georgia, where concerns over democratic backsliding and distancing from the EU path have strained relations.

A Strategic Window for Cooperation

The conditions are ripe for a more pragmatic partnership between the EU and Turkey in the South Caucasus. While this cooperation won’t materialize automatically, shared interests are more aligned than ever. To avoid being sidelined in a region of rising strategic value, Brussels must recognize that Turkey is not just a neighbor—it is a necessary partner.

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