Armenia–Turkey Normalization Faces Final Hurdle Before 2026 Deadline

Since gaining independence in 1991, Armenia has prioritized normalizing diplomatic ties with Turkey as a core element of its foreign policy strategy. The reasoning has been both economic—to lift the Turkish blockade and gain access to Mediterranean trade routes—and geopolitical, aimed at weakening the Azerbaijan–Turkey alliance.

In 2009, Armenia and Turkey signed the Zurich Protocols, agreeing to reopen borders and establish diplomatic relations. Despite intensive negotiations, Turkey refrained from ratifying the deal, largely due to Azerbaijani pressure. The effort stalled.

A renewed attempt began in 2021, catalyzed by the aftermath of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Armenia’s leadership, under the banner of a broader “peace agenda,” aimed to repair relations not only with Azerbaijan but also with Turkey. This shift aligned with Armenia’s Western-oriented foreign policy pivot, launched in September 2022, in response to a changing regional balance of power.

Russia’s diminished involvement in the South Caucasus—a consequence of its war in Ukraine—created a strategic vacuum. Russia’s non-response to Azerbaijan’s cross-border offensive in September 2022 highlighted Moscow’s waning reliability as a security guarantor for Armenia. As Russian setbacks mounted in late 2022, Yerevan saw an urgent need to decrease reliance on Moscow by easing hostilities with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

In this geopolitical context, Armenia–Turkey normalization was re-launched in January 2022, beginning with a meeting between special envoys in Moscow. Subsequent rounds followed, including a significant discussion on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in April 2025. These talks led to tentative agreements: opening the border to third-country nationals and initiating direct cargo flights.

Armenia made several symbolic and strategic moves to support normalization:

• It initiated a national dialogue on historical vs. present-day Armenia.

• Sent aid to Turkey after the 2023 earthquake.

• Renovated the Margara border checkpoint.

• Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended President Erdoğan’s inauguration and exchanged diplomatic gestures, including a symbolic book gift at the UN in 2024.

Despite these efforts, Turkey maintains that normalization hinges on a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Several reasons may explain this deadlock.

Firstly, President Erdoğan’s close alliance with Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev, reinforced by intertwined political and business interests, likely deters Ankara from acting independently of Baku. Secondly, Turkey might prefer co-managing the region with Russia, rather than displacing it. This is suggested by the 3+3 regional format, which excludes Western powers and signals Moscow-Ankara strategic cooperation in the South Caucasus.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to block peace talks, presenting preconditions and maintaining an aggressive posture. Its demands include the Zangezur Corridor and ongoing border provocations targeting Armenian villages—undermining public confidence in Armenia’s diplomatic outreach. The Civil Contract party’s recent electoral setbacks may reflect growing domestic skepticism.

As Armenia approaches its 2026 parliamentary elections, time is running out. Without visible outcomes from the peace agenda, the public’s patience is wearing thin. For Turkey and the broader international community, including the European Union and United States, the message should be clear:
The window for normalization with Armenia is closing fast.

Unless diplomatic momentum is restored soon, the region risks reverting to instability. The EU and US must proactively raise the issue with Turkey, encouraging Ankara to reconsider its stance and support a sustainable peace in the South Caucasus.