Stratfor: Why Turkey’s Ruling AKP Party’s Coronavirus Plan Could Be a Disaster

Amid the escalating domestic and global fallout from the COVID-19 crisis, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) faces an unprecedented political and economic challenge with few viable ways out. To bolster what remains of its legitimacy ahead of 2023 elections, the ruling party will likely double down on nationalist and protectionist policies. But by failing to address the core issues plaguing Turkey’s economy, including high unemployment and growing debt, these short-term power grabs will also ultimately fail to secure the AKP’s place in power. And as a result, the country’s deepening financial crisis may see the early demise of not only Turkish businesses, but the AKP’s continued political dominance.

COVID-19 Cripples Turkey’s Economy

Still reeling from its 2018 recession, Turkey’s fragile economy was ill-prepared for the deep domestic and global fallout from the COVID-19 crisis. Ankara has banned most travel and imposed curfews since the virus began to surge in mid-March, but has otherwise resisted a full national lockdown to stem the contagion. But even this partial lockdown has taken a steep toll on Turkey’s economy and financial stability. In April, the International Monetary Fund projected that Turkey’s economy would shrink by 5 percent in 2020, though that number may still be optimistic. Unemployment, which has long hobbled the country, is likely to be far above the already-high 13.8 percent reported in December, as tourism dried up and shops have closed.

In an attempt to preserve the lira’s stability, the country’s central bank, under the influence of the AKP, has already used up large amounts of its reserves, which have fallen an estimated $40 billion in January to $17-26 billion in April. Meanwhile, Turkey’s European trade partners — which account for half of all its exports — are now managing their own pandemic-induced economic recessions, further shrinking Turkey’s market opportunities in Europe.

Turkey’s post-lockdown strategy portends a long and painful recovery as well. The government’s four-phase ‘normalization’ plan will last until 2021, creating a political challenge for the AKP ahead of national elections in 2023. And, if the legitimacy of the party weakens enough, the party might face an internal split within its ranks strong enough to bring about an early election.

Cushioning the Blow

Turkey’s national agenda in the coming months will thus be driven by the political imperatives of a party in survival mode. The AKP’s influence over the central bank and parliament will enable it to use the country’s last remaining reserves however it sees fit. But rather than stabilize the economy, the party will use these funds on efforts to ease social strain and offset political pressure.

As the loss of revenue amid the COVID-19 crisis continues to drain the government’s reserves, the AKP will increasingly be tempted to lean on private banks and impose forms of capital controls to try to maintain the solvency of the lira, further sapping domestic consumption and lending, as well as foreign investment interest. In addition to dampening business and investor sentiment, Turkey is unlikely to obtain currency swaps with friendly powers such as the United States, who will be hesitant to provide currency to a central bank with a dubious record of independence.

The IMF option?

This will leave the AKP with the unpalatable option of turning to an institution such as the IMF for a potential bailout, which its nationalist supporters as well as Erdogan himself see as a threat to Turkey’s fiscal sovereignty. The AKP will avoid alienating these voters as long as possible, but the longer the AKP waits for IMF aid, the greater the stress in the economy — and the greater the erosion of its support amongst voters who will place economic health at the top of their concerns. At a certain point, it will likely become a greater political liability for the AKP to resist such aid than it is to take it. In the meantime, however, some Turkish businesses might go bankrupt as some $87.7 billion in short-term private sector debt begins to mature.

Potential for early elections

The AKP faces a future of deepening uncertainty. The challenges from opposition parties will likely grow as the AKP’s economic legitimacy fractures and its nationalist pivot is limited. The potential for an early election remains, especially if splinter parties manage to convince enough party officials in parliament to end the AKP’s long legislative hold. As the full effect of COVID-19 is felt over the coming months and years, the AKP will find itself grasping at straws to maintain its hold on power.  

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Published By: Atilla Yeşilada

GlobalSource Partners’ Turkey Country Analyst Atilla Yesilada is the country’s leading political analyst and commentator. He is known throughout the finance and political science world for his thorough and outspoken coverage of Turkey’s political and financial developments. In addition to his extensive writing schedule, he is often called upon to provide his political expertise on major radio and television channels. Based in Istanbul, Atilla is co-founder of the information platform Istanbul Analytics and is one of GlobalSource’s local partners in Turkey. In addition to his consulting work and speaking engagements throughout the US, Europe and the Middle East, he writes regular columns for Turkey’s leading financial websites VATAN and and has contributed to the financial daily Referans and the liberal daily Radikal.