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How War Could Reshape Politics in Türkiye

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By Seren Selvin Korkmaz


A wave of geopolitical crises—from the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023 to escalating Iran–Israel tensions, the weakening of Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the shift in U.S. security policy under Donald Trump’s second presidency, and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war—has created a new global security climate. These developments are no longer merely foreign policy issues; they are reshaping domestic political dynamics in many countries, including Türkiye. As economic pressures and geopolitical tensions intersect, Türkiye’s political competition may increasingly revolve around security narratives rather than the socioeconomic fault lines that have recently begun to reshape voter behavior.

Author Seren Selvin Korkmaz

A New Security Climate Beyond Foreign Policy

The chain of crises that has swept the Middle East and the broader international system in recent years has produced a new geopolitical environment.

The Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 triggered a regional security wave that continues to reverberate today. Rising tensions between Iran and Israel, the weakening of Hezbollah, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and shifts in U.S. security policy under President Donald Trump have all contributed to a profound transformation of the regional order.

Meanwhile, Europe remains shaped by the prolonged Russia–Ukraine war, which continues to affect security, energy markets, and geopolitical alignments.

Taken together, these developments have created a security climate that is redefining not only international relations but also the language, boundaries, and possibilities of domestic politics in many countries.

Türkiye is clearly among the states feeling the impact of this transition. Global developments are increasingly influencing the country’s domestic political dynamics in both predictable and unexpected ways.

How political actors respond to this transformation—and whether they are able to manage its consequences—may prove decisive for Türkiye’s political future.

From Identity Politics to Socioeconomic Fault Lines

Understanding Türkiye’s political trajectory during this period of crises requires looking beyond foreign policy. The country’s social and electoral landscape has also been undergoing important changes.

For much of the period since 2002, election outcomes in Türkiye often resembled a “census of identities.” Political analyst Bekir Ağırdır famously described this pattern as the “Three Türkiyes” model:

  • The CHP concentrated in coastal metropolitan areas

  • The AK Party dominating Central Anatolia and interior regions

  • Kurdish political representation shaping voting patterns in the southeast

However, recent data and election results suggest that these identity-based divisions have begun to crack.

Research conducted at IstanPol, comparing district-level election results with socioeconomic development indicators, indicates that political preferences are increasingly shaped by economic and spatial inequalities rather than purely identity-based divisions.

The 2019 and particularly the 2024 local elections marked a significant turning point.

During these elections:

  • The CHP consolidated its support in coastal metropolitan areas

  • It expanded into middle-income districts and urban areas

  • The ruling People’s Alliance largely preserved its base in lower socioeconomic segments

At the same time, signs of political searching have emerged among low-income conservative voters. The rise of the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Partisi) in this segment suggests growing dissatisfaction and a search for new political channels.

Overall, these developments indicate that political competition in Türkiye is increasingly shaped by socioeconomic inequalities rather than purely cultural or identity divisions.

Yet periods of crisis carry another characteristic: while the possibility of political change grows, regimes often discover new ways to reproduce themselves.

Rewriting the Rules of Political Competition

Recent political strategies pursued by Türkiye’s government can be interpreted within this broader framework.

Authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments often use crises as tools to restructure the political arena.

The results of the 2024 elections and the emergence of multiple opposition actors capable of demonstrating governing capacity created a strategic dilemma for the ruling bloc:

either adapt its political approach or reshape the structure of political competition itself.

Given the current political system, the second path appears more plausible.

One component of this strategy has been the renewed discussion of a controlled opening on the Kurdish issue. While this initiative can be interpreted as a response to regional developments, it has also served as a mechanism for realigning domestic politics.

In practice, the debate has created four distinct political fronts:

  • The governing coalition

  • The pro-Kurdish DEM Party

  • The CHP occupying a more independent position

  • Nationalist opposition forces rejecting the process

Regardless of how this initiative evolves, the debate itself has introduced new lines of political tension.

A second, and perhaps more critical, dimension concerns the institutional boundaries of political competition. Increasing judicial pressure on municipalities, opposition actors, and civil society has narrowed the arena of political contestation.

Efforts to sideline prominent political figures such as Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu illustrate how the governing system may attempt to limit the opposition’s governing capacity.

Security Politics and the “Rally Effect”

The third dimension shaping the political landscape is the growing prominence of security discourse centered on external threats.

As war spreads across the Middle East and tensions surrounding Iran intensify, the language of domestic politics inevitably shifts.

Political science literature offers extensive evidence that crises and wars tend to reshape political competition. One well-known concept is the “rally around the flag” effect, which describes how leaders often gain broader legitimacy during periods of national crisis.

This dynamic can create significant opportunities for leaders—particularly those facing declining political support or seeking to consolidate power.

During such periods, the focus of political debate typically shifts. Issues such as:

  • economic performance

  • income distribution

  • local governance

often recede from the center of the political agenda.

Instead, themes such as national security, state survival, and regional threats become the dominant framework of political competition.

In this environment, opposition parties often find their room for maneuver limited, as directly challenging security narratives can carry high political costs.

Strategic Importance and International Tolerance

The same security climate can also produce consequences at the international level.

As regional conflicts expand, countries with strategic positions—such as Türkiye—tend to gain greater geopolitical importance.

Türkiye’s role within NATO, its position along the security corridor stretching from the Black Sea to the Middle East, its relevance to U.S. regional strategy, and Europe’s dependence on Ankara for energy transit and migration management all increase the country’s strategic value.

In such contexts, international criticism of domestic political developments often becomes more muted.

Security priorities may push concerns about democratic standards into the background—something that has already been observable in recent years.

Politics in an Age of Crisis

Taken together, these dynamics reveal a clearer picture.

Major crises carry serious risks, but they also create opportunities for governments to rewrite the rules of political competition.

Türkiye today appears to be passing through precisely such a threshold.

On the social level, economic pressures, urbanization, and the performance of local governments are making voter behavior increasingly fluid.

At the same time, the political system is developing new mechanisms to manage and contain this fluidity.

In the end, Türkiye will continue to change. The direction of that change, however, will depend on both social preferences and the political forces capable of mobilizing them.

Periods of rupture rarely reward actors who assume change will naturally work in their favor. Instead, success typically belongs to those who can correctly read the shifting political terrain and adapt their strategies accordingly.

This is why one of the central questions of Türkiye’s political struggle today concerns who defines the political agenda.

Will the growing socioeconomic and economic fault lines move to the center of political debate?

Or will a narrative centered on crisis and security overshadow these underlying social transformations?

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