COLUMN: Which side is winning the battle around Ekrem Imamoglu?

The article by T24 newsportal columnist and acamedician (Mr) Ilker Ayturk frames the events of March 18–19, 2025, as a historical turning point for Turkey, comparable to major moments not seen since 1945. The government, led by the ruling coalition (primarily the AKP and MHP), took a radical and unprecedented step by initiating what the author describes as a total struggle where one side is destined for a significant victory and the other for a crushing defeat. Wnhics isde is winning?

This is a synopsis of a much longer analysis penned by Ayturk

The spark for this upheaval was the cancellation of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu’s 31-year-old university diploma on March 18, followed by his detention on March 19 and formal arrest on March 23. The article stresses that this was not a minor administrative decision but a deliberate, large-scale political operation designed to reshape the political landscape.

The mood is grim: Turkey has entered a political “black hole,” and while the turbulence’s final outcome is unclear, a quick, positive resolution is highly unlikely. Even if, against all odds, the arrests were reversed, and rights restored, the Rubicon has already been crossed. The political rules have changed permanently.

The article examines different scenarios, from the opposition’s best- and worst-case perspectives:

In the best-case scenario for the opposition, the imprisonment of İmamoğlu becomes a national rallying cry, maintaining public outrage for months.

The cost of abandoning democracy would steadily rise for the government. Even if freeing İmamoğlu would appear a humiliating retreat for Erdoğan, pressure might eventually force such a move. If released and reinstated, İmamoğlu could sweep the next presidential election, leading to a radical reconfiguration of Turkish politics.

The worst-case scenario is far darker:

Turkey evolves into a country where elections still occur but have no real meaning. Human rights, democratic values, and rule of law vanish from public discourse, creating a system resembling today’s Egypt — cooperating with the West only when necessary but fundamentally outside the democratic tradition.

A middle-ground scenario envisions continued repression and tension, culminating in elections held under extraordinary, deeply unfair conditions. İmamoğlu might remain imprisoned, making a credible opposition challenge almost impossible.

The article underlines the urgency for realistic awareness. Burying one’s head in the sand is no longer an option. The Turkish government has openly launched a struggle that will leave no room for neutrality.

The Power Bloc: Erdoğan and Bahçeli

The government’s coalition, the Cumhur İttifakı (People’s Alliance), is led by Erdoğan’s AKP and Bahçeli’s MHP, with support from minor parties like BBP, HÜDA PAR, and nationalist figures like Sinan Oğan and Kürşat Zorlu. Relations between major and minor players are hierarchical, with the two main leaders dictating policy without serious consultation.

The article argues that the March 18–19 operations could not have happened without Bahçeli’s approval. Despite rumors of cracks between AKP and MHP, the author believes that while some disagreements may exist, they are not yet severe enough to break the alliance.

Erdoğan is portrayed as a predictable leader, working rationally toward reelection in 2027. His goal: neutralize major rivals like İmamoğlu early, allowing time for public memory to fade and a sense of normalcy to return before the vote.

Bahçeli, by contrast, is opaque and unpredictable. Especially since initiating a “new (Kurdish) solution process” in October (with unclear motivations), he has become harder to read. His main concern likely centers on maintaining the MHP’s leverage, particularly regarding constitutional changes like abolishing the “50% +1” rule for presidential victories, a move he fiercely opposes.

Victory and Miscalculations

From the government’s perspective, the main success of the operation is that they sidelined İmamoğlu, arguably the opposition’s strongest candidate, and his election-winning team. However, the government also made several strategic mistakes:

Overreach: They aimed not just to imprison İmamoğlu but also to seize control of Istanbul’s municipality and possibly impose trustees (“kayyım”) over CHP headquarters.

Failed Execution: As with Putin’s failed rapid takeover of Kyiv, what was envisioned as a swift operation became a messy, prolonged fight.

Exposure of Weakness: Instead of projecting omnipotence, the government revealed the limits of its power. Public saw that, despite all the tools at their disposal (MİT, MASAK, judiciary), the charges lacked credibility.

Public Relations Disaster: The ruling bloc lost the battle of public perception. Even AKP’s grassroots base remained largely passive, revealing disillusionment. Mobilization only came after Erdoğan’s mother was allegedly insulted.

Damage to the “Ppopular Voice” Narrative: The traditional right-wing discourse of defending the “common folks” against bureaucratic elites has been deeply wounded. Without this, Turkish conservatism faces a profound identity crisis.

Mobilization of Opposition: The CHP, instead of splintering, rallied. A rapid extraordinary convention unified the party under Özgür Özel’s leadership with İmamoğlu as the undisputed presidential candidate. Historic street protests and a boycott were organized, culminating in a 15-million-strong endorsement vote for İmamoğlu.

Middle-Class Awakening: Urban, secular, educated middle classes, historically unorganized and overtaxed, have begun forming solidarity networks — a transformation likely accelerated by government overreach.

Youth Activation: Despite government efforts to indoctrinate youth through curricula and nationalist tech rhetoric, young people — especially secular and nationalist ones — have become visibly more active and leading demonstrations.

Balance Sheet

Despite all the negatives, the government’s primary achievement remains massive: they neutralized İmamoğlu at a critical moment. The author suggests that even if the costs are high, sidelining İmamoğlu might balance or outweigh the cumulative damage — at least for now.

Still, the government’s hope of crushing opposition quickly and cheaply has failed. They now face a long, exhausting struggle, where both stamina and adaptability will be tested.

In this first month:

The opposition has shaken the government more than expected.

Victory is far from assured for either side.

The government closes this first phase with profit at a heavy cost — a “gain from loss,” in the author’s words.

Going forward, Erdoğan will aim to reassert dominance, trying to convince the public that protests, boycotts, and opposition actions have not weakened him — but he faces a much more challenging landscape than before.

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