Ali Bayramoğlu: The Peace Process Begins Now

The first difficult phase of the peace process has now been overcome. Thus, we move beyond the opening maneuvering and into the actual beginning.

A Historic First Step: The PKK Convenes

The first major challenge was for the organization to convene a congress and declare a decision to lay down arms. And the expected announcement from the PKK has arrived. The group declared that it convened a congress based on Abdullah Öcalan’s request. While the outcome of the congress and an official disarmament decision have not yet been announced, the signals are very strong.

The statement said that the congress convened simultaneously in two locations and that the final decision will be announced after combining the outcomes of both. However, it strongly implies that the decision is based on “Öcalan’s call” and the “perspective and proposals he presented to the congress.” This clearly points toward a decision to disarm.

Beyond the Words: The Implications of the Statement

This statement also carries a number of other meanings.

At this point, it can be said that the transmission of Öcalan’s proposal and perspective document to the organization has fulfilled the precondition that had long been advanced by the Kurdish movement: that Öcalan should guide the congress or have direct contact with the group. At the same time, this suggests that the document in question was delivered to the organization by the state, that the state is following the developments around the congress, and that it is operating in parallel to the organization.

The significance of this stage must be fully grasped.

With the PKK’s congress and its probable decision to disarm, the peace process has now truly begun.

A Converging Point: State and Organization

This point in the peace process indicates that, under the region’s new conditions, the paths of the state and the organization have intersected. The state — as suggested in the nuanced statements of both Bahçeli and Erdoğan — now tacitly acknowledges both the Kurdish issue and the legitimacy of nonviolent Kurdish politics. Öcalan and the organization, for their part, have reached the conclusion that they can only preserve their existence and continue their struggle through politics, not arms.

This convergence has taken tangible form through negotiations and understandings among Öcalan, Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MİT), the organization, and the pro-Kurdish DEM Party.

While it is better to wait for the final declaration of the PKK’s congress — which will likely include certain conditions or expressions of goodwill — we can reasonably assume that the process will unfold in two phases.

First Phase: Legal and Political Framework for Disarmament

The first stage will involve addressing the legal and political requirements for disarmament. This includes amendments to the penal code, protective legal regulations for those involved in the process, and mechanisms for managing the practical aspects of disarmament — such as militant reintegration and monitoring.

This stage will mark the transition from a purely executive-led effort to one involving parliamentary politics, as laws must be passed through the legislature. In this sense, it represents a partial opening of what has so far been a closed process.

The second component of this phase will deal with the actual implementation of disarmament, the future status of senior PKK commanders, and Öcalan’s physical mobility. (It is worth noting that the PKK’s statement explicitly emphasized the struggle for Öcalan’s physical freedom.)

However, this phase is highly sensitive and prone to accidents, tension, and potential breakdowns.

Second Phase: Opening the Political Arena

The second phase refers to the creation of an open political environment for addressing the Kurdish question. This involves constitutional and legal reforms that expand the political field and accommodate key Kurdish demands — developments that, under normal conditions, should now gain momentum.

If this course is followed, it could lift the heavy security pressure that hangs over the political system. It might even strip the ruling power of its main justification for authoritarian policies.

Final Thoughts

Recent developments are both encouraging and hopeful.

About the Author:

Ali Bayramoğlu is a veteran Turkish columnist and political commentator known for his work on civil-military relations, democratic transitions, and Kurdish issues. A former columnist for Yeni Şafak and Karar, he has long been an advocate of liberal-democratic reform and played an important intellectual role during Turkey’s earlier peace process efforts. Bayramoğlu frequently writes on issues of identity, pluralism, and the rule of law.