Güldem Atabay: Political Engineering for Erdoğan’s Re-election and Why Hungary Matters

Hungary’s April 12 election is shaping up as a critical test for whether entrenched illiberal systems can be challenged through the ballot box. The outcome will resonate far beyond Budapest, carrying implications for global populist movements—and for Türkiye’s own political trajectory. As President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan faces constraints on running again, Ankara is entering a new phase of political engineering aimed at securing another term.

Hungary Heads to a Defining Vote

Hungary’s upcoming election is not just about whether Prime Minister Viktor Orbán remains in power after 16 years. It is effectively a referendum on the durability of the “illiberal democracy” model he has built.

Recent polling suggests that Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party has overtaken Orbán’s Fidesz. Some projections even indicate the opposition could approach a constitutional majority, though high undecided voter rates keep the outcome uncertain.

At stake is not merely a change in government, but whether a system shaped over years—spanning the judiciary, media, and regulatory institutions—can be meaningfully challenged through elections.

Why Hungary’s April 12 Elections Matter for Türkiye and the Future of Democracy

A System, Not Just a Leader

Orbán’s power does not rest solely on electoral performance. Over time, he has constructed a multilayered system in which state institutions and party interests are deeply intertwined.

This makes the election a test not only of popularity, but of systemic legitimacy. Even a defeat may not immediately dismantle the entrenched networks that sustain the current order.

The result will also have broader geopolitical implications. Orbán has cultivated close ties with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump, positioning himself as a key figure within the global nationalist right.

A loss would reverberate across Washington, Moscow, and Brussels alike.

Economic Pressures Weaken Orbán

Orbán’s growing vulnerability is largely rooted in economic deterioration.

For years, cultural and identity-based politics were paired with modest economic gains. Recently, however, rising living costs, fiscal imbalances, weak investment, and frozen EU funds have eroded public support.

Markets are closely watching the election, with some investors already pricing in a potential “post-Orbán” scenario—particularly given expectations that an opposition victory could restore EU relations and unlock billions in funding.

A New Opposition Dynamic

Unlike previous elections, Hungary’s opposition is no longer fragmented. Péter Magyar, a former insider within the Fidesz system, has emerged as a credible challenger.

His background allows him to both understand the ruling structure and appeal to disillusioned voters, including conservatives seeking change.

However, the outcome will hinge not only on urban voters but also on rural regions, where state support networks and local power structures continue to favor Fidesz.

Even a Defeat May Not End the System

Analysts agree that even if Orbán loses, the institutional framework he has built will remain influential.

If the opposition fails to secure a constitutional majority, dismantling entrenched networks across the judiciary, bureaucracy, and media will be difficult.

Even with such a majority, the challenge of restructuring the system could prove complex and politically costly.

Implications for Türkiye: Psychology Over Parallels

The importance of Hungary’s election for Türkiye lies less in direct parallels between leaders and more in the similarity of political models.

Both Orbán and Erdoğan have sustained long periods in power through a combination of:

• Electoral success
• State resource mobilization
• Media influence
• Judicial pressure
• Nationalist rhetoric

If Orbán loses, it could reshape the psychological landscape in Türkiye, reinforcing the perception that entrenched systems can be challenged electorally.

Such a result could boost opposition confidence and alter voter expectations.

Conversely, an Orbán victory would reinforce the narrative that strong leadership can prevail despite economic difficulties and external pressures—potentially emboldening Ankara’s current approach.

Erdoğan’s Re-election: A Question of Mechanics

In Türkiye, the central political question is no longer whether Erdoğan can win an election, but how he can legally run again.

Under the current system, his candidacy is not automatic. This creates three main scenarios:

1. Early Election via Parliamentary Vote

If parliament approves early elections with 360 votes, Erdoğan can run again. However, the ruling alliance lacks sufficient numbers on its own, making opposition defections essential.

2. Strategic Alignment with Opposition Blocs

Support from parties such as the DEM Party could provide the necessary votes. This would likely involve political concessions and complex negotiations.

3. No Early Election

If early elections are not called, Erdoğan’s candidacy could become legally contested. This could lead to constitutional reinterpretations or, less likely, an alternative candidate.

Economic and Political Strategy Combined

Beyond parliamentary arithmetic, Erdoğan faces a more fundamental challenge: the economy.

High inflation, declining real incomes, and fiscal pressures are directly shaping voter sentiment.

In response, Ankara appears to be pursuing a dual strategy:

• Redistributing public resources to sustain economic support and political loyalty
• Increasing pressure on opposition-controlled areas through legal and administrative means

Recent developments—including investigations, detentions, and institutional interventions—suggest that the electoral process is evolving into a multi-layered contest extending beyond the ballot box.

Conclusion: Elections as Systemic Tests

Both Hungary and Türkiye are entering periods where elections serve as broader tests of political systems rather than routine democratic exercises.

In Hungary, the question is whether an entrenched illiberal model can be reversed. In Türkiye, the focus is on how political engineering and institutional control will shape the next electoral cycle.

In both cases, the outcome will have implications far beyond national borders.