The U.K. and Turkiye need to tighten defence cooperation

Turkiye and the UK have much more in common when it comes to defence and national security interests than perhaps at any time in recent history.

Both are middling powers, perhaps the UK seeing its powers on the wane, post Brexit, and perhaps Turkiye, because of its much more strategic location, and some savvy prior decisions on investing in an autonomous military defence capability, is on the rise.

Both now share a similarly close but yet distant relationship with the European Union. Turkiye launched its EU accession bid in 1999, and became an EU candidate member state in 2005. But Turkiye has found its path to accession blocked by ingrained racism and Turkeyphobia in continental Europe, and by its own missteps on its path to meeting EU standards with respect to democracy, the rule of law and human rights. There have been failures in communication on both sides. By contrast, UK, which had what Turkiye yearned for as a full EU member state seemed, to throw that away in what can only be called a remarkable fit of political harakiri, Brexit. Both are now trying to redefine their relationship with Europe, to something still close but short of full membership. But for both the EU remains their largest trade partner.

Both have special historical relationships with the US. For the UK this was the so called treasured “special relationship” built on historical and cultural affinity, a close security bond built in two world wars and the Cold War. Turkiye and the US similarly have had a close relationship, built by common military endeavours in Korea, the war in Afghanistan, but not Iraq, but the US seeing value in Türkiye’s strategic location into the oil rich Gulf and Middle East, and also during the Cold War as a buffer against Communism.

And as with Europe, and other prior US strategic allies and partners, Turkiye and the UK, now feel nervous about the changing strategic priorities of the US, it’s focus on Asia and the Western hemisphere, and the question as to whether the US can still be trusted as an ally. Does the US nuclear umbrella still apply to Turkiye, for example? Is the UK nuclear deterrent independent of the US? It is not in reality.

Turkiye and the UK share similar interests in the war in Ukraine. Turkiye might try to balance its relationships with Russia and Ukraine, because it is neighbours to both, but it is clear that Turkiye and the UK both have no interest in a scenario where Russia defeats Ukraine. For both that would risk further expansion by Russia into Europe, and for Turkiye it would risk Russian domination of the Black Sea. For Turkiye a victorious Russia in Ukraine might see Moscow roll back Türkiye’s recently much increased (because of Russia’s overextension in Ukraine) influence in the South Caucasus, Syria and Central Asia. For both the latter would put at risk efforts in recent years to diversify energy supplies for Europe away from Russia.

Both Turkiye and the UK worry about an expansionist Russia, a US military and strategic withdrawal from Europe and a militarily weak Europe which is not able yet, or quickly, to fill gaps in its own defence.

Both see the need to increase defence spending to fill the void and counter the threat from Russia, but both are economically constrained.

The UK economy might be twice the size of the Turkish economy – $4 billion versus perhaps $1.6 billion – but it weighed down by high public debt (close to 100% of GDP), has deep structural problems (not helped by Brexit) which ensure weak growth dynamics. But the UK still has deep capital markets and ample access to international capital markets still at reasonable borrowing costs, albeit limited fiscal space to fund the planned increase in defence spending under NATO ambitions from 2% of GDP to 3.5%, then 5% on a wider definition. Turkiye benefits from low public sector debt (less than 30% of GDP) but suffers structural imbalances, high inflation, a history of currency devaluation and much more limited access to international capital markets and even then at a much higher cost.

Turkiye has prioritised defence spending in recent years, perhaps because it has faced more immediate and existential threats given its location. It has also benefited from a much more efficient defence procurement system – which frankly is no longer fit for purpose in the UK. Partly the kick start to Türkiye’s defence industrial sector was by need and less by design in that its recent tortuous relations with its hirthero NATO allies has meant its prior reliance on buying kit from NATO allies became a liability. Evidence herein was provided by the US decision to kick Turkiye off the F35 programme. But we can also see that with the tortuous negotiations over procuring a missile defence system. The long drawn out negotiations with the US, complicated by politics over human rights (Pastor Brunson, et al) eventually led Turkiye going to Russia to buy S400s over Patriots, and then being pushed out of the F35 programme. We can also see it with the new Kaan fifth generation fighter jet programme and Turkiye’s quest still to buy engines from so called NATO allies. In the end, frustrations over the reliability of defence relationships and supply chains with NATO allies led Turkiye to prioritise its own military industrial defence industries. And in recent years this has led to rapid progress across a range of sphere, including drones, missiles, naval shipbuilding, engines and military technology generally. Turkiye is rapidly filling the gaps.

What is clear from the above is that the UK and Turkiye now have many common national security and defence interests. It seems kind of obvious but the room for greater cooperation and coordination is significant and this can deliver win wins to both in an even more uncertain and challenging world.

This is only a portion of the excellent opinion written by Tim Ash, to read the of the article, pls click above this link