Turkish Polls Show Statistical Dead Heat Amid Record Economic Gloom
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Istanbul, November 2025 – With Turkey’s next major elections on the horizon, a series of public opinion surveys released in November 2025 paint a picture of extraordinary political tension: a race locked in a statistical dead heat between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), set against a backdrop of deep public pessimism over the nation’s economic future.
Analysis of the results from multiple research firms—including SONAR, ASAL, BETİMAR, and ORC—reveals massive volatility in partisan support, suggesting a highly fluid electorate where the difference between first and second place can be measured in a few decimal points.
The Overwhelming Economic Factor
The surveys confirm that the economy remains the single greatest political liability for the governing coalition. According to the SONAR poll, which spanned 26 provinces, public sentiment regarding the economic trajectory is overwhelmingly negative.
When participants were asked, “Will the Turkish economy get better or worse?” a decisive majority responded with deep pessimism:
- 60.4% believe the economy will “get worse.”
This figure underscores the immense pressure on the AKP to stabilize inflation and address the cost of living, issues that continue to erode public trust regardless of any political or judicial maneuvers by the government.
The Horse Race: A Conflicting Picture of Leadership
The most striking feature of the November polling data is the dramatic disparity between the findings of different research firms. While all firms agree the race is tight, their conclusions on which party holds the lead differ sharply, creating confusion about the actual political momentum:
| Pollster (November 2025) | AK Party (AKP) | Main Opposition (CHP) | Difference | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SONAR (Distributed) | 33.8% | 35.3% | CHP +1.5% | CHP takes the lead. |
| ASAL (Distributed) | 31.2% | 32.8% | CHP +1.6% | CHP maintains a slight edge. |
| ORC (Distributed) | 32.6% | 30.5% | AKP +2.1% | AKP holds the lead. |
| BETİMAR (Distributed) | 34.7% | 27.6% | AKP +7.1% | AKP opens a significant, unconfirmed gap. |
The data confirms that both the AKP and the CHP are clustered tightly between the 31% and 35% mark (once undecided votes are proportionally distributed). The outlier result from BETİMAR, showing a commanding 7-point lead for the AKP, stands in stark contrast to the near-parity reported by SONAR and ASAL, highlighting the critical role that different sampling methodologies and voter distribution models play in Turkey’s polarized political environment.
Political and Judicial Contests
Beyond the primary vote share, the polls provided crucial insight into public skepticism regarding high-profile political and judicial disputes:
Erosion of Trust in Espionage Charges
The government’s strategy of deploying legal tools against prominent opposition figures, such as the widely publicized “espionage” charges and arrests targeting figures like Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and journalist Merdan Yanardağ, appears to have failed to convince the public.
When asked whether they believed the individuals charged were guilty of espionage, 53.8% of respondents answered “No.” Furthermore, a majority view suggests that the government is not behaving justly in its consecutive operations against CHP-run municipalities, with an underlying perception that AKP-run municipalities receive “positive discrimination.”
The Kurdish Vote: A Critical Block
The surveys also provided clarity on the voting intentions of the DEM Party’s electoral base, which remains a key kingmaker in national elections. In response to potential government-led efforts to redraw political allegiances, DEM voters stated their overwhelming preference:
- 49.4% of DEM voters would align with the “Opposition Side.”
- Only 18.8% stated they would vote for the “Government Side.”
This solidifies the Kurdish political movement’s position as a reliable, if often complicated, partner for the secular opposition in a head-to-head election scenario.
Analysis: Is the CHP Falling Behind?
My analysis, based on the conflicting November 2025 polling data, suggests that the assessment that the CHP is “falling behind” is premature and risks misinterpreting the dynamic of volatility as retreat.
The evidence points not to a decisive retreat by the CHP, but rather a fierce stagnation and a failure to capitalize decisively on the unprecedented public anger over the economy.
Why “Falling Behind” is the Wrong Frame:
- Leading in Multiple Polls: Two of the four published polls (SONAR and ASAL) place the CHP marginally ahead of the AKP. In a 32-35% range, a 1.5% difference is statistically insignificant and represents a dead heat, not a collapse.
- Converting Discontent: The CHP is successfully capturing a large share of the 60% of voters who are economically pessimistic. This is a solid base. If the party were truly falling behind, the AKP’s numbers would be significantly higher across the board, which only the outlier BETİMAR poll suggests.
- The Counter-Narrative Failure: The government’s attempts to shift the narrative from the economy to security and judicial scandals—such as the “espionage” arrests and the divisive “Terror-Free Turkey” rhetoric—have failed to convince the public majority, thereby preventing the AKP from creating the distance it needs.
The Real Challenge: Stagnation, Not Retreat
The true challenge for the CHP is not that it is falling, but that it is stuck. Despite the worst economic crisis in recent history, the CHP cannot decisively break past the 35% ceiling to build an unassailable lead. This stagnation suggests two critical weaknesses:
- Failure to Offer a Clear Alternative: The CHP may still be struggling to present an economic recovery program that is perceived as credible and different enough from the current government’s policy to convert the entire pool of disgruntled voters.
- Resilience of the AKP Core: The AKP maintains a fiercely loyal voter base that supports the party despite economic hardship.
Conclusion: The November 2025 polling environment is defined by volatility, not stability. The CHP is not definitively falling behind, but it is locked in a tight, head-to-head battle where its ability to win depends entirely on its success in the coming months in converting economic dissatisfaction into a clear, single-digit lead. The election remains a contest between the economy (CHP’s advantage) and political polarization (AKP’s advantage).
